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How a Board Actually Changes

Two routes: run candidates in a contested election, or petition for removal. The arithmetic is different for each, and cumulative voting changes what is possible.

There are two lawful paths to a different board. They have different mechanics, and the second one is where most homeowner efforts fail on arithmetic rather than on support.

Route one: run candidates🔗

The simplest path is also the one nobody took here in 2024. Under our Election Rules § 2.2.4, any qualified member may nominate themselves. When more qualified candidates run than there are open seats, the association must run a full secret-ballot election with an independent inspector — the acclamation shortcut under Civil Code § 5100 becomes unavailable.

Directors serve three-year staggered terms under Bylaws Article IV, Section 6, and Election Rules § 6.1 requires an election for a seat at least once every four years. Seats come open on a schedule.

Route two: removal before the term ends🔗

Bylaws Article IV, Section 8 allows removal of one or more directors, with or without cause, by “a majority of the owners” at a duly called regular or special meeting. Article II, Section 2 defines “majority of owners” as those holding 51% of the votes then entitled to vote.

Calling that meeting is not the hard part. Bylaws Article III, Section 4 obliges the President to call a special meeting on the petition of a majority of owners; Corporations Code § 7510(e) sets a lower bar, allowing 5% of members to call a special meeting.

The cumulative voting problem🔗

Our Bylaws authorize cumulative voting for both the election and the removal of directors (Article II, Section 1; Article IV, Section 8). Election Rules § 3.2 describes how it works: a member may multiply their votes by the number of seats being filled and concentrate them on a single candidate.

Corporations Code § 7222(b) then provides that where cumulative voting is authorized, no director may be removed — unless the entire board is removed — when the votes cast against removal would be sufficient to elect that director if voted cumulatively.

The practical consequence: a director with a modest but loyal bloc of support is very difficult to remove individually. The statute’s own parenthetical, “unless the entire board is removed,” is the express exception. A removal directed at the board as a whole is not subject to the same protection.

This is a structural feature of the statute, not a loophole. It should still be run past a California HOA attorney before anyone acts on it, because the interaction between § 7222, the Bylaws’ 51% threshold, and the quorum rules below is genuinely intricate.

Quorum, and what AB 1458 changed🔗

Bylaws Article II, Section 3 sets the quorum for a members’ meeting at a “majority of owners” — 51%. In a community where roughly 60% of units are renter-occupied and many owners are absentee, assembling 51% in one room is the obstacle that has historically defeated homeowner efforts everywhere.

AB 1458, effective January 1, 2024, addressed exactly this. Under Civil Code § 5115(d), if a meeting to elect directors fails for lack of quorum, the meeting may be adjourned to a date at least 20 days later. At that reconvened meeting, the quorum requirement drops to 20% of the association’s members, voting in person, by proxy, or by secret written ballot received.

To use the reduced quorum, the association must give notice of the reconvened meeting at least 15 days beforehand, including the date, time, and location, the list of candidates, and a statement that 20% will satisfy the quorum requirement.

That notice requirement cuts both ways. If the association intends to rely on the reduced quorum but fails to give the required notice, the reduced quorum is not available to it.

Proxies🔗

Bylaws Article II, Section 4 permits voting by proxy. A proxy must be filed with the Secretary before the meeting, and must specify the matters on which it grants authority and how the vote is to be cast. Election Rules § 3.1.1 adds the outer limit: no proxy is valid for more than 11 months from the date it is executed.

Two things follow. First, a proxy that fails to specify its matters is vulnerable to being rejected by the inspector of elections, who under Election Rules § 4.1.1(b) determines the authenticity and validity of proxies. Second, an 11-month window is long enough to gather authorizations well ahead of a meeting — but it is a hard expiry, and proxies gathered too early simply lapse.

Note also that a proxy is not a secret ballot. Where a matter requires secret ballot under Civil Code § 5100, a proxy is generally used to establish quorum and to obtain the ballot, not to substitute for it.

Last reviewed August 19, 2026